Issue: Whether the District Court Will Be Reversed With Respect to the Exclusion of Evidence.
| Area of Law: | Litigation & Procedure |
| Keywords: | Reversal of decision; Admission or exclusion of evidence |
| Jurisdiction: | Federal |
| Cited Cases: | 413 F.2d 823; 112 F.3d 747; 41 F.3d 182 |
| Cited Statutes: | None |
| Date: | 07/01/2001 |
In general, a district court has "broad discretion" to permit or prohibit testimony. Bristol Steel & Iron Works v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 182, 188 (4th 1994). Thus, this Court will give "substantial deference" to a district court’s decision to exclude evidence and will not reverse "absent a clear abuse of discretion." United States v. Achiekwelo, 112 F.3d 747, 753 (4th 1997). Moreover, with respect to the decision to exclude evidence generally, a district court does not abuse its discretion unless its ruling is "manifestly erroneous." Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1997).
More specifically, in determining whether to admit or exclude secondary evidence as an exception to the best evidence rule the Supreme Court noted long ago that "a very large amount of discretion must be reposed in the trial court." Probst v. Trustees of Domestic Missions, 129 U.S. 182, 188 (1889). The trial judge alone, not the jury, decides whether the excuse tendered for offering secondary evidence is sufficient. See Fed. R. Evid. 1008; 6 J. McLaughlin, J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 1004.13[4] (2d ed. 2001); see also Development Corp. v. United Bonding Ins. Co., 413 F.2d 823, 825 (5th Cir. 1969) ("the sufficiency of the foundation laid for the admission of secondary evidence rests largely in the discretion of the trial court").
Thus, "the determination of the trial judge on the admission of secondary evidence will not be disturbed in the […]