Issue: Under Mississippi law, should a motion in limine be granted because evidence is irrelevant?
|Area of Law:||Litigation & Procedure|
|Keywords:||Motion in limine; Relevance of evidence|
|Cited Cases:||42 So. 204; 657 P.2d 267; 597 P.2d 1108; 46 Or. App. 701; 226 Kan. 308|
|Cited Statutes:||Miss. R. Evid. 401|
In Whittley v. City of Meridian, 530 So. 2d 1341 (Miss. 1988), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a motion in limine should be granted when “(1) the material or evidence in question will be inadmissible at trial under the rules of evidence; and (2) the mere offer, reference, or statements made during trial concerning the material will tend to prejudice the jury.” Id. at 1344 (quoting State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 311, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979)).
Lunda was a trespass and nuisance suit commenced by landowners to recover damages arising from the invasion of their property by dust, noise and fumes emanating from an adjoining cement plant. In rejecting the defendants’ argument that no nuisance existed because they had been issued an air contaminant discharge permit from the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality and had not been cited for any violations of the permit, the court pointed to the same provision in the permit at issue there as appears in the permit here as support for its holding. “Conformance with pollution standards does not preclude a suit in private nuisance.” Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or. App. 701, 613 P.2d 63, 67 (1980).
That result squarely comports with long-standing Mississippi law as expressed by the Mississippi Supreme Court in King v. Vicksburg Ry. & Light Co., 88 Miss. 456, 42 So. 204 (1906), where it was held that a license permitting the operation of […]