Issue: Whether an interest in bodily security is protected by the Fifth Amendment?
| Area of Law: | Constitutional Law |
| Keywords: | Interest in bodily security; Fifth Amendment |
| Jurisdiction: | Federal |
| Cited Cases: | 430 U.S. 651; 774 F.2d 1252; 441 U.S. 520 |
| Cited Statutes: | Fifth Amendment; Fourth Amendment |
| Date: | 06/01/2001 |
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a protected liberty interest may be derived from the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977). The Supreme Court also specifically recognized that a liberty interest in bodily security is grounded in the Fifth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Further, the liberty interests protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are distinguishable. Under the Fourth Amendment, an intrusion must be reasonable in relation to the circumstances of a particular arrest. Kidd v. O’Neill, 774 F.2d 1252, 1260 (4th Cir. 1985). However, under the liberty interest afforded by the Fifth Amendment, intrusion may not amount to punishment of a detained citizen who has not yet been tried. Id. at 1260.
A court must decide whether a particular custodial action is reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose, or, if not, whether it is punitive. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538. Factors indicating that a government action is punitive in nature are:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment–retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it […]
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